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A Court’s Continuing Obligation to
Ensure Fairness of
Class Action Settlements
FILIP GRZELAK*
In April 2010, Deepwater Horizon, a BP-operated drilling rig, exploded killing eleven workers and poisoning the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico with 210 million gallons of oil.
Some 90,000 cleanup workers become involved in the response; many became sick after exposure to crude oil and
Corexit, a chemical used to disperse the oil. A class action
against BP ensued. A settlement was reached in 2013 and
provided for a two-phased compensation mechanism, which
class action experts praised for effectiveness and fairness.
Soon, however, it became clear that the settlement was
neither effective nor fair. Many cleanup workers were denied the compensation that they were promised under the
administrative-based phase one of the settlement. Instead,
they were forced into the ongoing litigation-based phase
two, where their individual claims must be brought to federal
courts. Plaintiffs have become stuck with an unfair settlement and federal courts could be bogged down with a multitude of personal injury trials—an unwanted result of any
class action settlement. This Comment argues that after
*
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covers “unsexy” topics of civil procedure and class action, was selected for publication by the University of Miami Law Review, Volume 72. I am grateful to Professor Sergio J. Campos, my faculty advisor, for his insights and guidance, and to
Elizabeth Montano, Keelin Bielski, Hannah Gordon, and Anabel Blanco for their
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Tadzio and Mabel, who for over a year endured my weekly Miami-Atlanta airplane commutes—I trust that you will grow up to become the best versions of
yourselves.
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granting a judicial approval of a class action settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), courts should
have a continuing duty as a fiduciary to the class to ensure
fairness and effectiveness of the settlement.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is one of the fairest and most impressive settlements I have seen in more than 20 years of practicing, teaching and writing in the field of class actions.”1
“This settlement is an extraordinary achievement
that realizes the great objectives behind court supervised class settlement.”2
“This Court . . . , class counsel, and counsel for BP
deserve high praise for producing this historic settlement, one that provides meaningful and substantial
benefits to the class.”3
These were the statements that Dean Robert Klonoff and Professor Samuel Issacharoff, prominent practitioners and scholars in the
area of class action lawsuits,4 made about the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Settlement Agreement (“MSA”).5 Judge Carl J. Barbier of
the Eastern District of Louisiana approved this settlement in In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico

1

Transcript of Final Fairness Hearing Proceedings at 183, In re Oil Spill by
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295
F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179), Doc. No. 7892 [hereinafter Fairness
Hearing].
2
Declaration of Samuel Issacharoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class Settlement at 15, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”
in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No.
2179), Doc. No. 7116-2 [hereinafter Issacharoff Declaration].
3
Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class Settlement at 63, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”
in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No.
2179), Doc. No. 7116-2.
4
Id. at 1–4; Issacharoff Declaration, supra note 2, at 2–3.
5
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement
as Amended May 1, 2012, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in
the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No.
2179), Doc. No. 6427-1 [hereinafter MSA].
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on April 20, 2010.6
With the help of legal experts, the MSA was carefully drafted to
compensate cleanup workers and coastal zone residents who suffered from crude oil and other chemical exposure during the cleanup
efforts following the disastrous 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico.7 The oil spill not only devastated the fishing,
shrimping, and tourist industry of the coastal areas of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (suffering businesses were
later compensated under a separate settlement),8 but it also devastated the lives of tens of thousands of cleanup workers and local residents, 9 who suffered either acute (short-term) or chronic (longterm) medical conditions—mostly related to the skin, eyes, throat,
sinuses, and lungs—after the chemical exposure.10
Despite the enthusiastic statements that were made at the time
the settlement was being approved, the implementation of the MSA
did not work as intended. Despite British Petroleum’s (“BP”) public
promises to take responsibility for both the oil spill and its consequences, as of November 2018, merely 22,836 out of 37,225 claimants were awarded $67.2 million in compensation. 11 The paid
6

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex. on
April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) [hereinafter Final Approval of the
Deepwater Horizon MSA].
7
See MSA, supra note 5, § I; Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon
MSA, 295 F.R.D. at 117–18, 149–50.
8
Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as Amended on May 2, 2012 at 1–5, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790
(5th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-30095).
9
On July 8, 2010, approximately 47,000 cleanup workers were deployed.
Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a6032/bp-oil-spill-statistics/. However, because of high rotation and replacement rates, the overall number of workers who were employed during the cleanup
operations was significantly higher. Cf. Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon
MSA, 295 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that “[a]s many as 90,000 response workers engaged in near-shore and offshore Response Activities in the Gulf of Mexico . . . .”).
10
See Specified Physical Conditions Matrix at 6–9, Final Approval of the
Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179), Doc.
No. 6427-10 [hereinafter Matrix].
11
Status Report from the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Settlement
Claims Administrator at 4, 9, Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295
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amount is grossly inadequate to the scale of the 2010 Gulf Spill,
especially considering that both economic and medical claims were
to be paid out of a $20 billion escrow account that BP set up during
the spill.12 Further, the paid amount is inadequate considering that
the law firms representing the plaintiffs in the Plaintiff Steering
Committee that negotiated the MSA received $680 million in legal
fees.13 Looking at the MSA over six years after the court approved
the settlement, it appears that this inadequate payment has left thousands of class members undercompensated or uncompensated,
which threatens the federal courts with additional and unnecessary
litigation due to the back-end litigation option in the MSA.”14
Thus, even the best designed class action settlement—or at least
one highly praised by the legal community—may not guarantee equitable results. Unfortunately, even if a court that approved a class
action settlement notices that the settlement does not work as intended, it has no power to reevaluate the agreement.15 Under Rule
23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court may approve [the proposed class action settlement] only after a hearing and
on finding that [the settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”16
Once the settlement is approved, the court has no continuing duty to

F.D.R. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179) [hereinafter November 2018 Status
Report]; CNN Wire Staff, BP Apology Campaign Begins Airing, CNN (June 3,
2010, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/02/oil.spill.bp.apology/index.html. It is estimated that around 200,000 people—cleanup workers and
coastal residents—could belong to the class. Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at
193.
12
Steven Mufson, BP, Plaintiffs Reach Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Settlement,
WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bp-plaintiffs-reach-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-settlement/2012/03/02/gIQAL9
OwnR_story.html?utm_term=.9645558d5b8e.
13
Katherine Sayre, BP Oil Spill: Two Louisiana Law Firms to Receive $87
Million Each in Attorney Fees, NOLA.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.nola.com/
business/index.ssf/2017/04/bp_lawyer_fees.html. In comparison to the MSA, the
economic and property damages settlement, as of April 2019, has paid over $11
billion. DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMS CTR., PUBLIC STATISTICS FOR THE DEEPWATER HORIZON ECONOMIC AND PROPERTY DAMAGES SETTLEMENT 3 (2019),
http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/docs /statistics.pdf.
14
MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
16
Id.
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reassess the fairness of the settlement over time even if the settlement proves to be unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate.17
This Comment uses the MSA as an example of why the Judicial
Conference of the United States should consider amending Rule
23(e)(2) to allow courts to reassess the settlement when justice so
requires.18 Part I of the Comment will provide a brief overview of
how U.S. circuit courts interpret Rule 23(e)(2) and how the rule was
modified in 2018. Also, it will discuss the court’s duty as a fiduciary
to the class. Part II will shed light on the Deepwater Horizon MSA,
especially on the mechanism of compensation designed under the
Matrix-based phase one and the litigation-based phase two. Part III
will provide the analysis of how and where the MSA failed to provide fair, reasonable, and adequate solutions to the dispute between
BP and the class members. The purpose of this Part is not simply to
point out errors, which in hindsight may be an easy task, but to show
that even a seemingly carefully crafted class action settlement might
fail to accomplish its goals. Part III will also show that some changes
to Rule 23(e)(2)—to allow courts to reassess the settlement after the
judicial approval—could be a practical remedy to prevent similar
mistakes in implementing future class action settlements. Part IV
will conclude with final thoughts on why the courts should be able
to reassess class action settlements after granting initial approval.
I. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23(E)(2)
A. Circuit Courts’ Factors
Over the years, circuit courts have developed different tests interpreting the meaning of “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in regards
to settlements of class actions lawsuits. 19 The Fifth Circuit, where
the settlement in Deepwater Horizon was approved, uses the Reed
factors.20 These include

17

See id.
The Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to create and
revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
20
Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983).
18
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(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the
probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits; (5) the
range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of
the class counsel, class representatives, and absent
class members.21
Other federal circuits use similar factors. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit uses the Bennet factors, which include
(1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of
possible recovery; (3) the point on or below the range
of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable; (4) the complexity, expense
and duration of litigation; (5) the substance and
amount of opposition to the settlement; and (6) the
stage of proceedings at which the settlement was
achieved.22
The 2018 amendment to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure drafted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure added four baseline factors that courts must consider in
assessing the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class action settlement.23 These factors include “[1] the class representatives
and class counsel have adequately represented the class; [2] the proposal was negotiated at arm's length; [3] the relief provided for the
class is adequate (taking into account four subfactors); and ([4] the
proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.”24

21

Id.
Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984).
23
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 18–19
(May 18, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-06-standingagenda_book_0.pdf (starting at page 415) [hereinafter Advisory Committee
Memorandum].
24
Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 23, at 18–19.
22
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Even after considering these factors and concluding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”25 it is possible that the
court may be making a mistake by approving the proposed settlement. For example, even though the court may approve a settlement
agreement in good faith, the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the settlement may change or simply be different from
what was expected.26 Another possibility is that the court, experts,
or the parties may make an honest error in misevaluating the monetary value and fairness of the settlement.27 Also, it is possible that—
despite the court’s best efforts to detect any wrongdoing—the settlement might be a result of fraudulent collusion between the plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants.28 Under the current language of Rule
23(e), the court has no practical instrument to rectify its mistake of
approving an unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate settlement.29
B. Court’s Duty as a Fiduciary
There are two theories on the role of courts in approving class
action settlements. One theory recognizes “that a class action settlement is a private contract negotiated between the parties” and that
“Rule 23(e) requires the court to intrude on that private consensual
agreement merely to ensure that the agreement is not the product of
fraud or collusion and that, taken as a whole, it is fair, adequate, and
reasonable to all concerned.”30 Thus, this view argues that the role
of the court is limited and—absent fraud or collusion—the court
must approve the settlement as long as it finds it sufficiently fair,
adequate, and reasonable.31 Under this view, in contemplating the
Rule 23(e)(2) requirements, courts are “[not to] focus on individual
25

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
See infra Section III.C.
27
See, e.g., Courtney v. Andersen, 264 F. App’x 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that class members “bore the risk of mistake” in a settlement and were
bound by even reasonable mistakes).
28
On the dangers of possible collusion, see 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:4 (15th ed.), Westlaw (database updated
Oct. 2018).
29
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
30
In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 934 (8th
Cir. 2005).
31
Id.
26

2019]

A COURT’S CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO ENSURE FAIRNESS

1001

components of the settlements, but rather view them in their entirety” and consider the facts “in the light most favorable to the settlement.”32
The other theory treats the court as a fiduciary of the class. When
examining and approving the settlement, the court becomes a fiduciary to the parties bound by the settlement because “fiduciary relationship[s] usually arise . . . when one person assumes control and
responsibility over another.”33 Judge Posner explains that “courts
have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase
of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore
to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”34 Therefore, being a fiduciary “requires district judges to exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class
actions.”35 In other words, “[a] court must approve a class action
settlement because the parties that are present and settling the case—
class counsel, the class representatives, and the defendants—are
proposing to compromise the rights of absent class members.”36
Thus, a judge’s role in a class action settlement is peculiar and
differs from the judge’s typical role “as a neutral arbiter between
two competing parties.”37 In non-class-action settlements, because
no fiduciary relationship exists, courts do not examine the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement and, unless there is

32

Isby v. Bayh 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v. Bd.
of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 1980)).
33
Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002).
35
Id. at 279.
36
4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTION § 13:40 (5th ed.),
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018).
37
Id. Compare CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2363 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018) (“A voluntary dismissal by stipulation [of all parties] under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is effective
immediately and does not require the court’s approval.”), and Adams v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., 863 F.3d 1069, 1080 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 41(a)(1) cases require
no judicial approval or review as a prerequisite to dismissal; in fact, the dismissal
is effective upon filing, with no court action required.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)
(“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class proposed to be
certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
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a consent decree, courts have no power to interpret the settlement.38
If, subsequently, a dispute arises as to the interpretation of the settlement, parties can file a new lawsuit alleging a breach of contract.39
However, if in a class action settlement the court is a fiduciary of
the absent class members, the court needs to ensure that class representatives and class counsel have not compromised plaintiffs’ interests in settling the case.40 Because the court is presented with a nonadversarial mode of introducing a settlement, the court is “required
to make a decision using a mode of decision-making unfamiliar to
courts.”41 To fulfill this obligation, “the judge must adopt the role of
a skeptical client and critically examine the class certification elements, the proposed settlement terms, and procedures for implementation.”42
Assigning courts a continuing duty to ensure fairness of the settlement also arises from difficulty, or even impossibility, to collaterally attack a properly approved settlement.43 This is because the
Supreme Court ruled that “under elementary principles of prior adjudication . . . [a class action settlement] is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation” as it would be in “[a] judgment in
favor of either side [which] is conclusive in a subsequent action be-

38

See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see, e.g., Adams, 863 F.3d at 1080 (stating
that “[t]he reason for the [voluntary] dismissal is irrelevant under Rule 41(a)(1)”
and holding “that the district court erred in concluding that counsel engaged in
sanctionable conduct by stipulating to a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) for the purpose of forum shopping and avoiding an adverse result”). Cf. Fred O. Goldberg,
Enforcement of Settlements: A Jurisdictional Perspective, FLA. B.J., July/Aug.
2011, at 31, 31–32 (discussing a similar proposition under the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure).
39
85 JAMES L. BUCHWALTER, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 4 (2d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Mar. 2019) (“As with contracts generally, the elements of a
cause of action for breach of a settlement agreement are (1) the contract, (2) the
plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach,
and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. . . . When interpreting a settlement
agreement, a court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the agreement.”).
40
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:4.
41
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, § 13:40.
42
Id. (quoting DAVID F. HERR, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.61
(4th ed. 2004)).
43
See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30.
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tween them on any issue actually litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment.”44 In other words, class
members who fail to opt out of a class are bound by the settlement.45
The only other means of a class member challenging the binding
nature of a class settlement is a direct appeal from the district court’s
approval of the settlement. 46 Collateral attacks are thus frowned
upon as they would undermine finality to judgments entered on class
action settlements and “[c]ourts are wary of disturbing settlements,
because they represent compromise and conservation of judicial resources, two concepts highly regarded in American jurisprudence.”47 A collateral attack is available only in limited instances
“to consider whether the procedures in the prior litigation afforded
the party against whom the earlier judgment is asserted a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.”48
Despite the guidance of the Bennet and Reed factors and the
newly added factors under Rule 23(e)(2) to help courts evaluate fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class action settlement, settlements may still prove to be inequitable and ineffective—and the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Settlement Agreement is a good example of how “one of the fairest and most impressive [class action]
settlements” went all wrong.49 If we agree with the stipulation that
the district judge is a fiduciary to the class before the final judicial
44
Id. (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874
(1984)).
45
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985); Matsushita
Electric Industries Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385 (1996); MCLAUGHLIN, supra
note 28, § 6:30.
46
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30 (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S.
1, 10–11 (2002)). Circuit courts recognize district courts’ judicial discretion in
approving the settlement as district judges have deeper knowledge of the facts of
the case. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see, e.g., In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir.
1998).
47
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30 n.8 (quoting Anita Founds., Inc. v.
ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1990)).
48
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001),
aff’d by an equally divided court in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003)
(per curiam) (quoting Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648–49 (9th Cir.
1999)) (internal quotation omitted).
49
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 183.
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approval, I argue that we should expand that fiduciary duty to cover
the full time period to implement the settlement.
II. DEEPWATER HORIZON MEDICAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, an oil drilling platform
in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and ultimately sunk.50 The explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon led to a devastating oil spill.51 BP, one of the world’s largest oil companies, was
ultimately held liable for the spill.52 During and after the spill, BP
engaged tens of thousands of cleanup workers in a large-scale operation of containing and removing the oil.53 Their work lasted from
late April 2010—immediately after the spill—until mid-June 2013,
although most work was done by early April 2012.54 Cleanup workers and coastal residents who suffered exposure to crude oil and
Corexit, a toxic chemical sprayed over the Gulf to disperse the oil,
brought personal injury lawsuits against BP and other companies involved in this environmental disaster.55 Ultimately, parties entered
into the MSA, which the District Court approved on January 11,

50

Deepwater Horizon – BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECAGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulfmexico-oil-spill (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
51
Id.
52
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657,
757 (E.D. La. 2014) (finding BP sixty-seven percent (67%) liable for the oil spill).
53
See Repanich, supra note 9. It is estimated that around 200,000 people,
cleanup workers and coastal residents, could belong to the class. Fairness Hearing,
supra note 1, at 193.
54
Margaret M. Kitt, Protecting Workers in Large-Scale Emergency Responses, 53 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 711, 711–12 (2011); Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill Timeline, Updated from April 2010 Through 2014, AL.COM
(Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.al.com/news/beaches/index.ssf/2014/04/deepwater_horizon_timeline_upd.html; Telephone Interview with Craig T. Downs,
Founding Partner, The Downs Law Grp. (Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Downs Telephone Interview].
55
In August 2010, seventy-seven cases, including those brought by state governments, individuals, and companies, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under Multi-District Litigation
docket MDL No. 2179. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 731
F. Supp. 2d 132 (U.S. J.P.M.L. 2010).
TION
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2013. 56 This was the same agreement that many established law
scholars considered “one of the fairest settlements they had seen.”57
The Deepwater Horizon MSA divided the claims into two
phases. 58 Under the first phase, each class member with adequate
affidavits or medical records was to be compensated for a Specified
Physical Condition (“SPC”) according to the list of tables known as
the “Matrix,” which specified medical conditions, times of physical
manifestation of the condition, and proof required for compensation.59 Under the second phase, known as the Back-End Litigation
Option (“BELO”), a class member with a “later-manifested physical
condition” (“LMPC”) diagnosed after the cut-off date of April 16,
2012, was to be allowed to litigate the claim in court.60 The lucrative
enterprise of claim processing and administration was assigned to
the Garretson Resolution Group (“Garretson,” often referred to in
Court documents as “GRG” or “Claims Administrator”).61
A. Compensation Under the Matrix: Specified Physical Condition
To be compensated under the SPC, a claimant had to go through
several steps and meet multiple requirements.62 First, a claimant had
to submit a Proof of Claim form to Garretson.63 The form was a
twenty-eight-page document asking for personal and background information, basis for participation in the MSA, proof of status as
cleanup worker or zone resident, benefits claimed, information on
medical conditions, as well as information about bankruptcy, liens,
and healthcare insurance coverage.64 Claimants had to submit the
form to Garretson no later than one year after the “effective date” of
February 12, 2014 or they would lose their right to be compensated
56

Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La.

2013).
57

Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 183.
See MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI, VIII.
59
Id. § VI; Matrix, supra note 10.
60
MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.
61
Id. § XVIII.A.11.
62
Id. § VI.
63
Id. § VI.A.
64
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement: Proof of Claim Form, Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL
No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-7.
58
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under the SPC.65
Depending on the type of medical condition suffered because of
exposure and the level of proof presented, claimants could qualify
for different levels of compensation.66 To receive the lowest compensation under A1 level ($1,300 for cleanup workers and $900 for
zone residents), a claimant had to declare the manifestation of a
medical condition within a prescribed timeframe (within seventytwo hours of exposure).67 Compensable conditions enumerated in
the Matrix included dermatitis (rash), conjunctivitis (eye irritation
or eye burn), sinusitis (nasal inflammation), pharyngitis (throat irritation), as well as acute conditions such as headache, dizziness, and
fainting.68
Higher levels of compensation required more proof.69 To qualify
for higher compensation, A2, A3, and A4 (a lump sum between
$2,700 and $12,350), a claimant had to present supporting medical
records that Garretson evaluated “based on the totality of the evidence . . . whether that evidence more likely than not supports the
assertions made in the declaration.” 70 To qualify for the highest
level of compensation, B1 ($60,700 for cleanup workers and
$36,950 for zone residents), a claimant had to present relevant medical records establishing ongoing care for a chronic condition as well
as “indicate that exposure was considered by either the claimant or
the medical professional to be related to the condition(s) or symptom(s).”71 Garretson later interpreted this provision as requiring not
only medical diagnosis, but also doctor’s statement that the medical
condition resulted from exposure to crude oil or Corexit.72
65

See MSA, supra note 5, § V.A; Press Release, GRG Subject Matter Experts, Deepwater Horizon Medical Settlement Effective Date Announced; Claims
Administrator Garretson Resolution Group to Begin Processing Claims (Feb. 14,
2014), https://web.garretsongroup.com/press-releases/press-release/deepwaterhorizon-medical-settlement-effective-date-announced-claims-administrator-garretson-resolution-group-begin-processing-claims [hereinafter GRG Press Release].
66
See MSA, supra note 5, § VI.
67
Matrix, supra note 10, at 1, 13–14.
68
Id. at 6–8, 12.
69
Id. at 1–5.
70
Id. at 1–3.
71
Id. at 4–5.
72
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
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Garretson then evaluated the form’s “sufficiency and completeness” pursuant to § XXI.C–F of the MSA. 73 Among other tasks,
Garretson verified whether a claimant could either be found in one
of the cleanup worker training, employment, or medical encounter
databases, or had enough documents to claim zone residency.74 If
either the form or the required documents were incomplete or insufficient, Garretson sent the claimant a Notice of Defect that contained
a brief explanation of why the form was being rejected and whether,
and how, claimant could cure the defect.75 If Garretson denied a
SPC claim for compensation, a claimant could request a one-time
review conducted by Garretson.76 After receiving the Notice of Denial, a claimant had fourteen days to request such review by submitting a Request for Review form and any necessary additional documents.77
Theoretically, the process of compensation under the SPC was
simple and straightforward—the more proof of suffered medical
condition a claimant presented, the higher the compensation he or
she was to receive. 78 However, as Part III of this Comment will
show, there were multiple problems with applying and interpreting
the SPC provisions, and these problems precluded many class members from receiving compensation.79
B. Back-End Litigation Option
To be compensated under the BELO, a plaintiff must first submit
to Garretson a written Notice of Intent to Sue (“NOIS)” and identify
particular diagnosed medical conditions that the plaintiff will allege
in the BELO claim.80 After the NOIS is submitted, Garretson then
reviews the submission for compliance and, if the diagnosed medical conditions meet the requirement, Garretson transmits the NOIS
73

MSA, supra note 5, §§ V.B, V.D, XXI.C–F.
Id. § XXI.D–E.
75
Id. § V.E.
76
Id. § V.M.
77
Id.; Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement: Request for Review Form,
Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013)
(MDL No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-9.
78
See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5.
79
See infra Part III.
80
MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.VV, II.UUU, VIII.A.
74
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to BP.81 The MSA requires Garretson to review the NOIS and transmit it to BP within ten days.82 Then, BP has thirty days to choose
whether to mediate the claim.83 If BP chooses not to mediate, the
plaintiff acquires the right to file a BELO action, provided it is filed
within six months of the date Garretson informs the plaintiff of BP’s
decision not to mediate.84 Thereafter, the parties have ninety days
for initial disclosures. 85 These include documents required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), as well as additional
documents required by the Case Management Order (“CMO”). 86
Before the end of the 120-day initial proceedings period, the parties
must either stipulate to remain in the Eastern District of Louisiana
or to be transferred to another United States District Court for further proceedings.87 In case of disagreement, parties may submit motions regarding the proper venue.88
Neither the CMO nor the MSA specify how, and whether, a
BELO complaint can be amended.89 For example, there is no clear
process for how a plaintiff is to amend the BELO complaint in cases
where the plaintiff becomes diagnosed with additional medical conditions that are claimed to result from the exposure during cleanup.90
Such cases are not unusual, especially when it takes Garretson as
long as eight months—instead of ten days as mandated by the
MSA—to process the NOIS.91 While BP argues that plaintiffs may

81

Id. § XXI.I.
Id. § VIII.C.1.
83
Id.
84
Id. § VIII.C.2.
85
BELO Cases Initial Proceedings Case Management Order ¶ II, In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 27,
2016), Doc. No. 14099 [hereinafter CMO].
86
Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
87
CMO, supra note 85, ¶ III(1).
88
Id. ¶ III(2).
89
See id.; MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.
90
See MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.
91
Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings and Memorandum in
Support ¶ 8, Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 17-CV-0202-DAE (W.D. Tex. Oct.
25, 2017) [hereinafter Odom Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings].
82
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not “add additional claims for newly alleged [medical conditions],”92 some plaintiffs reason that they may essentially add new
medical conditions by staying the pending complaint, submitting another NOIS with new medical conditions to Garretson, and then, after waiting for Garretson to process the NOIS, consolidating both
BELO claims.93 Such procedure, which practically makes amending
BELO complaints impossible, seems unnecessarily difficult and
burdensome for plaintiff.94
Only limited issues may be litigated in a BELO action.95 These
include the fact of correct medical diagnosis, the amount and location of crude oil and Corexit, the level and duration of claimant’s
exposure, the fact of legal causation, alternative causes of injury,
and the amount of compensatory damages. 96 However, punitive
damages are disallowed.97 Arguing over the amount and location of
crude oil and Corexit may be problematic because there are no precise maps of where and when crude oil appeared and where Corexit
was sprayed. 98 Thus, to prove the fact of exposure and the level of
contamination plaintiffs will have to rely on cleanup workers’ and
residents’ testimony, as well as on local media reports.
III. HOW THE DEEPWATER HORIZON MSA PROVED TO BE UNFAIR,
UNREASONABLE, AND INADEQUATE
Over time, despite the initial enthusiasm from the academic

92

The BP Parties’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2,
Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 17-CV-0202-DAE, No. 17-CV-0202-DAE
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2017).
93
Odom Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings, supra note 91, ¶ 8; see also
MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.UUU, VIII.A, VIII.C.1, XXI.I.
94
Telephone Interview with Charles F. Herd, Jr., The Lanier Law Firm (Jan.
31, 2018) [hereinafter Herd Telephone Interview].
95
MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.G.3.a.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See Environmental Response Management Application: Gulf of Mexico,
NOAA, https://erma.noaa.gov/gulfofmexico/erma.html#/layers=3+446+5328+
16023+482&x=-89.87561&y=28.90952&z=6&panel=layer (last visited on Apr.
4, 2019) (select “Deepwater Horizon MC 252 Incident” layer); Tracking the Oil
Spill in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/01/
us/20100501-oil-spill-tracker.html (last visited on Apr. 17, 2019).
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community,99 the MSA has proven to be unfair to many class members as well as inefficient, as it threatens to burden the federal court
system with unnecessary litigation. From the outset, the settlement’s
healthcare provisions have not provided much-needed medical help
and condition diagnoses to often uninsured class members.100 This
resulted in many claimants’ inability to be diagnosed or to gather
sufficient medical documentation before the required deadline.101
At the same time, claimants had to fight Garretson, who disregarded
some of the MSA provisions, showed incompetence, and often, instead of staying impartial and objective, sided with BP.102 Further,
because of failing some procedural requirements of the MSA, many
claimants were undercompensated or not compensated at all for
their injuries, and their claims were moved to the second litigationbased phase of the settlement.103 These BELO claims, because of
the high number of potential claimants, threaten to congest many
federal district courts with highly technical cases in which plaintiffs
must prove a causal connection between their injuries and exposure
to crude oil and Corexit.104 The story of the MSA thus shows that
without a court’s continuing obligation to ensure fairness of class
action settlement under Rule 23(e)(2), end results of even a meticulously designed settlement may be unjust and ineffective in reaching
its goals in compensating large groups of harmed individuals.
A. Inadequacy of the MSA’s Medical Provisions
To provide the former cleanup workers and zone residents with
proper medical care, BP and the Plaintiff Steering Committee agreed
to include in the MSA the Periodic Medical Consultation Program
(“PMCP”) and the Gulf Region Health Outreach Program
(“GRHOP”). 105 These initiatives, however, were not designed to

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Sections III.B, III.F.
See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
MSA, supra note 5, §§ VII, IX.
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help identify medical conditions caused by the oil spill and subsequent cleanup efforts.106 As a result, medical conditions of many indigent class members without health insurance were not properly
diagnosed before the cut-off date, barring those class members from
making valid claims under the first phase of the settlement, the
SPC.107 Plaintiffs argue that this medical program was nothing more
than a façade on behalf of BP to create the illusion that BP was acting on plaintiffs’ behalves, only to hide BP’s objective of minimizing payments to class members.108
Richard Godfrey, the defendants’ attorney, and Robin Greenwald, an attorney of the Plaintiff Steering Committee, presented the
purpose of and the procedures for implementing the PMCP and the
GRHOP during the Fairness Hearing.109 The principal goals of these
two programs, respectively, were to provide “a significant and tangible benefit, especially to those class members who might not otherwise have access to or be able to afford primary medical services” 110 and “to increase . . . the capacity of healthcare systems
throughout the areas that were most impacted by the oil spill.”111 As
defendants explained with respect to the PMCP, “we have a medical
care issue in this country, and many [claimants], or at least some of
these people, may not have had access [to healthcare] . . . they now
have access and will be given access [to healthcare]. That's an important benefit [of the MSA].”112
Thus, it was a stated goal of the PMCP to help class members in
receiving medical care.113 To implement the program, first, Garretson would “enter into a written contract with each medical services
provider selected to provide medical consultation visits” near class
members’ places of residence.114 Then, Garretson was supposed to

106
Id. The following paragraphs expand on the notion that the PMCP and the
GRHOP were not designed to help diagnose medical conditions for SPC claims.
107
Downs Telephone Interview supra note 54.
108
Id.
109
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 49–76, 180–96.
110
Id. at 218.
111
Id. at 190.
112
Id. at 218.
113
Id.
114
MSA, supra note 5, § VII.C.4.
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contact every class member, find out where they lived, find the closest facility to do medical tests and consultations, and schedule an
appointment for each person.115 Appointments were to be scheduled
every three years for the next twenty-one years following the effective date of February 12, 2014.116 Medical visits were to consist of
a medical examination, a vision screening, and additional blood,
urine, cardiac, and respiratory tests performed at the discretion of
the physician.117 Overall, defendants maintained that “[t]he program
w[ould] have a rapid positive impact on the physical, mental and
behavioral health of Gulf Coast community members, and these
benefits will be realized not just for the five years but long thereafter.”118
The MSA, however, created a paradoxical situation that made
the PMCP purposeless. Generally, to claim the program’s benefits
and be tested for a claimed medical condition, a claimant would
have to have first filed an SPC claim, in which he or she had to both
ask to be qualified for the program, as well as claim their medical
condition under the SPC.119 This meant that the only way to claim
compensation above the basic A1 level ($1,300 for cleanup workers
and $900 for residents) at A2, A3, A4, and B1 levels (which required
medical documentation), was for a claimant to have a medical diagnosis of his or her condition made not under the PMCP, but paid
from his or her own pocket.120 This was disastrous for many indigent
class members who did not have health insurance and could not pay
for costly medical tests required to get diagnosis.121 Therefore, these
class members never had the means to get their conditions diagnosed
for the purpose of an SPC claim.122 As Greenwald admitted during
the Fairness Hearing, there was “no fund set up for people . . . to go
to a doctor and get their diagnoses” and there was “no place that they
115

Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 252–53.
Id. at 189; MSA, supra note 5, § VII.B.3.
117
Components of the Periodic Medical Consultation Program, Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL
No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-14.
118
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 218.
119
MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI.D., VII.A.
120
See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5.
121
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
122
Id.; Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 257–58.
116
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[could] go before they file[d] their claim form to find out what they
ha[d].”123 If a claimant could not be diagnosed for the purpose of
receiving compensation, what then was the purpose of the PMCP?
Practically speaking, if a claimant could not afford medical diagnosis—a process that often included not just a visit to a primary
care physician, but also multiple visits to and costly medical tests
from a specialist—such a claimant was arguably precluded from receiving compensation higher than the A1 level. Jason Melancon,
one of the objectors to the MSA, stated as much during the Fairness
Hearing: “[G]uess how much money has been allocated to give
[class members] an initial diagnosis? None. There isn’t a single
penny allocated to where my clients can see someone right now and
figure out whether or not they have a chronic problem that is associated from their exposure.”124 Melancon proposed that the MSA
should include the right to go to a doctor for initial evaluation.125
But, instead of allocating funds for the purpose of helping class
members receive medical diagnosis, BP and the Plaintiff Steering
Committee agreed in the MSA to spend $105 million on enigmatic
community outreach programs.126 These programs were “a set of integrated projects designed to improve healthcare capacity and health
literacy for Class Members and others in Gulf Coast communities.”127 As Melancon concluded,
I love the fact that it is an open-ended, uncapped settlement, theoretically. . . . [But] if [you] can't go to
the doctor, and you can't afford to see a doctor, or

123

Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 257–58.
Id. at 244.
125
Id. at 247.
126
MSA, supra note 5, § IX (outlining the “Gulf Region Health Outreach Program,” which had the stated purpose of “expand[ing] capacity for and access to
high quality, sustainable, community-based healthcare services”).
127
Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112, 123 (E.D.
La. 2013); see also MSA, supra note 5, § IX. To Melancon’s suggestion that the
MSA does not specify what “community outreach programs for mental and behavioral health services” are, Judge Barbier responded to “Google it and find out.”
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 247. Unfortunately, even the most laborious
search engine inquiries do not bring any cogent explanation of the meaning of
“community outreach programs for mental and behavioral health services.” Id.
124
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you can't afford to see a toxicologist, then you're necessarily going to be shuffled into the $1300 classification.128
Melancon’s prediction came true as the MSA essentially put “a practical cap [on recovery under the SPC], despite the fact that there
[was] no theoretical cap.”129
B. Some SPC Claims Were Unnecessarily Moved into BELO
As Melancon predicted during the Fairness Hearing, 130 many
class members whose claims were denied—either because they
lacked proper medical documentation or due to defendant-friendly
interpretations of the settlement agreement by the claims administrator—are being forced into the litigation phase of the settlement.131
A class member who did not receive appropriate medical help in
diagnosing his or her recurring health symptoms (e.g. skin irritation,
cough, wheeze, tightness in the chest, and burning in the eyes, nose,
throat, or lungs being symptoms of acute or chronic dermatitis, sinusitis, or conjunctivitis) could only claim $1,300 in damages, as
opposed to $12,350 or $60,700.132 Many of these claimants, some
with multiple conditions, will now have to participate in the litigation phase that was originally intended for class members with medical conditions manifesting years after the exposure, including leukemia and other cancers.133
Seemingly straightforward, the MSA is vague in describing under what circumstances a claimant could qualify for the SPC,134 and
also when his or her claim is being pushed into BELO.135 Although
Garretson (and BP) managed to eventually persuade the court that
the MSA was unambiguous in this matter, such interpretation is

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 244.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5.
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 255–56.
See MSA, supra note 5, § VI.
See id. § VIII.G.
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problematic. 136 Paradoxically, although Garretson admitted that it
“ha[d] no authority to interpret [the MSA’s] terms,” in the very same
memorandum, it interpreted the terms of the MSA regarding classification of diagnosis made after April 16, 2012.137 Garretson argued
that when the MSA’s definition of “later-manifested physical condition” under section II was read together with section VIII.B.1, its
meaning was clear.138 Later-manifested physical condition was to
“mean a physical condition that is first diagnosed in a [claimant]
after April 16, 2012.”139 Additionally, per MSA section VIII.B.1, a
claimant “who is diagnosed with a [LMPC] may either (i) seek compensation for that [LMPC] pursuant to workers’ compensation
law . . . or (ii) seek compensation from BP for that [LMPC] pursuant
to the [BELO]. Such [claimant] may not seek compensation . . . in
any other manner.”140
Garretson concluded that because of this language, a claimant
who meets LMPC requirements “is foreclosed from seeking compensation for a [SPC].”141 However, the language of the MSA does
not unequivocally exclude claimants who qualify for LMPC from
having an SPC claim under the Matrix.142 In other words, the MSA
does not state that the LMPC and the SPC are mutually exclusive.143
Further, it does not explain that if a claimant is eligible for the
LMPC, he or she is automatically forced out of the first settlement
phase into the second, litigation-based phase. 144 Judge Barbier,
however, agreed with Garretson’s and BP’s interpretation of the

136

Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54; see Memorandum from Garretson Resolution Group, Claims Administrator, to Hon. Sally Shushan (May 13,
2014), Classification of Chronic Physical Conditions First Diagnosed After April
16, 2012 at 2, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon, MDL No. 2179
(E.D. La. July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Garretson SPC Memorandum].
137
Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136.
138
Id.
139
MSA, supra note 5, § II.VV.
140
Id. § VIII.B.1.
141
Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136, at 2.
142
MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.B.
143
See id.
144
See id.
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MSA that a class member who was diagnosed with a chronic condition after April 16, 2012, was excluded from asserting an SPC claim,
and could only assert a LMPC claim under the BELO.145
Earlier understanding by both the plaintiffs and the defendants
during the Fairness Hearing contradicts this new interpretation of
the MSA.146 Robin Greenwald, a liaison counsel for the plaintiffs,
made an un-contradicted statement that “[BELO] is designed for
people who get sick 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now.”147 She also stated
that “all class members can sue BP on what’s call[ed] a B[E]LO, a
back-end litigation option, if they were to unfortunately experience
a later manifested physical condition.”148 Similarly, Richard Godfrey, one of defendants’ attorneys, stated that “if you discover . . .
that you have what you consider to be a later-manifesting condition,
then you have the B[E]LO that you have to decide and exercise your
rights under.”149 Godfrey provided this interpretation of the BELO
during a discussion of the benefits of the PMCP, which, as he stated,
gave class members “the opportunity to learn whether or not there
is going to be some [medical] condition that they are not aware
of.” 150 Godfrey’s statement may be understood to mean that the
BELO was designed to provide a litigation backdoor to those class
members whose conditions manifested during a medical screening
under the PMCP, which was to be available on the “effective date”
of February 12, 2014.151 Thus, the widely accepted understanding—
of both the plaintiffs and the defendants—was that the BELO would
apply only to later-manifested conditions and not to conditions that
had appeared during the twenty-four to seventy-two hour timeframe

145

Order Regarding Medical Benefits Settlement – Policy Statement on Classification of Chronic Physical Conditions First Diagnosed After April 16, 2012,
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
July 23, 2014), Rec. Doc. 13,179 [hereinafter Order Regarding Medical Benefits
Settlement].
146
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 190, 216–17, 255.
147
Id. at 255.
148
Id. at 190.
149
Id. at 217.
150
Id. at 216.
151
MSA, supra note 5, § VII.B.3 (“The PERIODIC MEDICAL CONSULTATION PROGRAM shall begin on the EFFECTIVE DATE, and last for 21
years from the EFFECTIVE DATE.”); GRG Press Release, supra note 65.
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provided in the Matrix but were diagnosed by a medical professional
after April 16, 2012.
Another problem is that, although the MSA includes definitions
for over a hundred different terms, it fails to define the terms “diagnosed” or “diagnosis.”152 If Garretson, as it claimed, “is bound to
follow the plain language in the MSA,”153 it should also admit that
the plain meaning of the term “diagnosed condition” is not necessarily equivalent with a medically diagnosed condition or with a
condition diagnosed by a medical professional, but could just as well
mean “self-diagnosed condition.”154 Merriam Webster defines the
verb “diagnose” as “to recognize (something, such as a disease) by
signs and symptoms” or as “to analyze the cause or nature of.”155
Therefore, the plain meaning of the word does not necessarily
equate to medical diagnosis made by a medical professional. The
question that the Court did not consider is whether a class member
who recognized his or her own medical condition without having it
diagnosed by a medical professional should nonetheless be automatically excluded from making a claim under the SPC.
Continuing with the semantic vagueness of the MSA, the settlement’s definition of the LMPC does not explain the meaning of
“later manifested.”156 If “later manifested” refers to a condition that
manifested itself after the timeframe provided in the Matrix, (i.e. either twenty-four or seventy-two hours after exposure, depending on
the resulting medical condition) and the time of medical diagnosis
is after April 16, 2012, then, under the current interpretation, the
MSA created a gap between the SPC claim and BELO claims.157
For example, if a claimant’s medical condition manifested itself after the time between exposure and manifestation, as provided in the
Matrix, and was also diagnosed by a medical professional before the
cut-off deadline of April 16, 2012, the claimant has no avenue for

152

MSA, supra note 5, § II.
Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136, at 2.
154
Definition of Diagnose, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diagnose (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
155
Id.
156
MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.VV.
157
Matrix, supra note 10, at 6–14.
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legal redress.158 Such a claimant would neither qualify for a remedy
under the SPC (because his or her condition manifested itself too
late, after the timeframe provided for in the Matrix) nor under the
BELO (because the condition was diagnosed by a medical professional too early, before the cutoff date of April 16, 2012).159
Under a scenario such as this, a claimant must either (1) lie about
the time when his or her condition manifested itself and sign a “declaration under penalty of perjury . . . asserting that such condition(s)
(or the symptom(s) thereof) occurred within the applicable
timeframe,” or (2) conceal any medical diagnosis made before April
16, 2012, and get a new diagnosis after that date to qualify for the
BELO.160 Either solution forces the claimant to behave unethically
or fraudulently if he or she wants to be compensated.
Finally, the decision to interpret the meaning of the MSA was
made retroactively, meaning that it bound claimants without allowing them an opportunity to adapt their strategy for receiving compensation to the changing interpretation of the settlement.161 From
November 2012, when the MSA was still being approved by the
court, until April 2014, when BP and Garretson proposed their interpretation of the LMPC, plaintiffs’ attorneys were not able to predict that the MSA would be interpreted to preclude recovery by
claimants whose conditions were not diagnosed by a medical professional before April 16, 2012 from making a claim under the
SPC.162 As one cleanup worker explained, he does not understand
how he and his fellow workers were supposed to know they needed
to get a medical diagnosis before April 2012, since at that time the
MSA had not even been approved yet, and the class members therefore still did not know the final conditions of the settlement.163

158

Id.; MSA, supra note 5, § II.VV; see Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at
233–34.
159
See MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI, VIII.
160
Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–2, 4.
161
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
162
Id.; Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 190.
163
David Hammer, BP Medical Interpretation Could Cut out Thousands,
USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2014/08/15/bp-spill-cleanup-medical-claims/14094089/.
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C. Many SPC Claims Were Uncompensated
or Undercompensated
Another problem under the MSA is that the settlement gave Garretson an almost absolute and virtually unreviewable power to determine whether claims are valid or not and what level of compensation is due to each claimant. As of November 2018, when Garretson filed its latest periodic status report, 22,836 claimants had been
awarded $67.2 million in compensation.164 Thus, the average compensation per person has been around $2,944.165 Not all awards were
paid to the claimants: 490 claimants had unresolved liens, such as
healthcare- and bankruptcy-related liens, which precluded payment. 166 At the same time, thirty-six percent (36%) of the total
37,225 claimants (or 13,403 claimants) were denied any compensation under SPC.167
The small number of awarded claims and amounts of compensation contrast starkly with the expected implementation of the
MSA that plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys presented to the court
at the Fairness Hearing.168 For example, during the Fairness Hearing, Robin Greenwald, representing plaintiffs, suspected that around
200,000 people, cleanup workers and residents, could belong to the
class.169 In April 2010, approximately 105,000 coastal residents that
could qualify for compensation lived in the MSA-designated zones,
and approximately 13,000 cleanup workers made approximately
20,000 visits to the BP medic stations in connection with work-related conditions.170

164

November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 3.
Of course, this is an average, which means that the wide majority of approved claims, almost eighty, were determined to be compensated under A1 level
(that is, the lowest, $1,300, compensation under the SPC). Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 4–5.
168
See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1.
169
Id. at 193.
170
Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112, 131 (E.D.
La. 2013).
165
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D. Uncompensated or Undercompensated SPC
Claims Could Clog Federal Courts
Because of the decision to preclude the class members who qualify for a LMPC claim from asserting an SPC claim, many claimants
were forced out of compensation under the Matrix and into the
BELO, which is a costlier second phase of the settlement agreement
requiring litigation. 171 The denied SPC claims (possibly several
thousands of them), instead of being compensated according to the
Matrix, will soon be flooding federal courts, causing potential disruptions and clogging dockets.172 Only a few of these cases have already been filed, and there is a risk that not all claimants will have
their day in court as some of the claims will be below-cost cases that
attorneys will not want to work on, especially because they are labor-intensive and prospective damages are too low.173
Plaintiffs’ attorneys expect that in the next few years, claimants
are likely to file thousands of BELO claims. 174 As of November
2018, class members had filed a total of 6,699 Notice of Intention
to Sue claims (“NOIS”), 4,080 of them were approved by Garretson,
and, of those, 2,673 claims have been eligible to be filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana.175 In fact, many more, “possibly thousands,” of BELO claims are expected to flood the Eastern District
of Louisiana, as well as other federal courts that will be handling
these cases.176

171

Order Regarding Medical Benefits Settlement, supra note 145, at 6.
However, some plaintiff attorneys argue that medical claims under the Matrix—even those B1 claims that Garretson rejected because they were diagnosed
after the cut-off date of April 16, 2012—cannot be litigated under the BELO and
that only non-Matrix conditions, such as cancers, can be litigated under the BELO.
Telephone Interview with Andre F. Toce, Principal Attorney, The Toce Firm (Jan.
30, 2018) [hereinafter Toce Telephone Interview]. Nonetheless, other plaintiff attorneys agree that previously uncompensated SPC claims can be litigated under
the BELO. See Back-End Litigation Option Complaint ¶ 22, McGill v. BP Expl.
& Prod., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00130-CJB-JCW (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2018) (listing
chronic sinusitis as one of the claimed conditions caused by the exposure).
173
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
174
Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
175
November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 11–13.
176
Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
172
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E. Many BELO Claims Will Be Transferred to
Other District Courts Around the United States
The massive number of expected BELO claims will not only
pose a problem for the Eastern District of Louisiana, but also for
other district courts across the United States. This is because BELO
claims are likely to be adjudicated not where the injury occurred
(which would include the four federal districts along the Gulf), but
where plaintiffs currently reside and where their medical conditions
were treated. 177 In transferring venue, courts follow 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) which states that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”178
To determine when a § 1404(a) venue transfer is appropriate,
courts follow the Gilbert test that applies four private interest factors
and four public interest factors.179 The private interest factors include “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.”180 Additionally, the public interest factors include
(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the
forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4)
the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of
laws [or in] the application of foreign law.181
The Eastern District of Louisiana has already applied the Gilbert
factors in some of the BELO cases to determine the most suitable

177

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
Id.
179
In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)).
180
Id.
181
Id.
178
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venue.182 For example, in one case where the plaintiff worked and
was injured in Jefferson Parish, in the Eastern District of Louisiana,
but currently resides and is treated for his health conditions in Baton
Rouge in the Middle District of Louisiana, the court transferred the
case to the Middle District of Louisiana.183 In another case where
plaintiff resided and worked in Pensacola, in the Northern District
of Florida, but later moved and has been treated for his medical conditions in San Antonio, Texas, the court transferred the case to the
Western District of Texas.184
In many cases, scattering BELO claims around different district
courts—even after applying the Gilbert factors—may lead to unjust
and unreasonable results. For example, if a claimant was a cleanup
worker in Alabama or northern Florida but currently resides and is
treated in Miami, Florida, his or her case will likely be heard in the
Southern District of Florida.185 As one plaintiff explains, “trial of
this case in [a district court outside the Gulf region] is expected to
take longer, since more time will be needed to educate the judge
and/or jury on these issues.”186 This is because it takes time for each
presiding judge to become familiar with even just the most important documents of the over 25,000-item docket,187 including the

182

See Order and Reasons on Motion at 2, Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No.
16-CV-15974 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Odom Order and Reasons on
Motion]; Order and Reasons on Motions at 2–3, Worley v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc.,
No. 16-3620 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Worley Order and Reasons on
Motions].
183
Worley Order and Reasons on Motions, supra note 182.
184
Odom Order and Reasons on Motion, supra note 182.
185
See Annie Correal, The Life of Hispanic Immigrant Cleanup Workers in
the Gulf, FEET 2 WORLDS (June 24, 2010), http://www.fi2w.org/2010/06/24/thelife-of-hispanic-immigrant-cleanup-workers-in-the-gulf/ (describing specifically
the experience for Hispanic immigrant workers). Many Hispanic workers from
South Florida were employed as cleanup workers to clean up the shorelines. See
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 241.
186
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain at 2, Odom
v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 16-CV-15974 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
Odom Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain].
187
As of April 25, 2019, the docket contained 25,600 entries. In Re: Oil Spill
by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010
(2:10-md-02179), CT. LISTENER https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4510515/
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facts of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the subsequent spill, the
cleanup efforts, and the terms of the MSA. 188 As one plaintiff
pointed out in his filing, “[i]t is extremely unlikely that any other
court in America is as knowledgeable or experienced [as the Eastern
District of Louisiana] in handling the multitude of facts and legal
issues which have been generated as a result of the BP Oil Spill.”189
Also, a jury in other states may not fully appreciate the scale of
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and of the ensuing cleanup operations, at least not as well as local jurors who either experienced the
spill or have a better understanding of how the spill affected their
communities. The fact that the MSA mandates qualifying BELO
cases to be transferred away from the Gulf region under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), favors defendants. If BP was consistently tried in federal
or state courts of the Gulf region, it is likely that the verdicts would
be reflective of the local juries’ sense of fairness—results that any
defendant in BP’s shoes would want to avoid.
Transferring the venue to outside the Gulf region may also create
other problems for plaintiffs and their attorneys. Many, if not most,
attorneys litigating BELO actions are located in the Gulf states.190
Because these law firms are usually small and consist of a few attorneys who likely limit their practice to one or two states, these attorneys would need to become registered with each of the federal
district courts in the states where the venue has been transferred.191
Small plaintiff law firms—unlike the big law firms that BP retained
to defend the BELO cases—have limited resources, both human and
financial, to invest in litigating their clients’ cases in multiple jurisdictions.192
The process of “just, speedy, and inexpensive” adjudication may
in-re-oil-spill-by-the-oil-rig-deepwater-horizon-in-the-gulf-of-mexico/?filed_after=&filed_before=&entry_gte=&entry_lte=&order_by=desc (last updated Apr.
25, 2019).
188
Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
189
Odom Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain,
supra note 186, at 1.
190
A web search of lawyers and law firms representing individuals in BELO
actions against BP indicates that most attorneys litigating BELO actions are located in Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Mississippi.
191
Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
192
Id.
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suffer when venue is transferred outside the Gulf region.193 Fortunately, in cases where a claimant currently resides in a distant state
but multiple other factors show his or her close contacts with the
federal districts of Eastern Louisiana, Southern Mississippi, Southern Alabama, or Northern Florida, either the court or BP may be
persuaded that the venue should not be transferred away from the
Gulf region.194 For example, in an ongoing BELO case, plaintiff resides in the Eastern District of Tennessee, but his injury and medical
treatment took place in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and his
expert witnesses also reside within the jurisdiction of the latter district court.195 In this case, BP stipulated that the appropriate venue
for the trial was the Eastern District of Louisiana.196
Not scattering the claims around different federal districts is also
important because it gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an opportunity to
consolidate claims consistent with where and when injuries occurred.197 Consolidating cases would significantly lower litigation
costs, for example, by requiring only one expert witness testimony
instead of multiple testimonies by the same or multiple experts and
by reducing the number of motions and pleadings, thus cutting down
the workload for the attorneys.198

193

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s BELO Complaint ¶ 6, Banegas v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. 17-7429 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Banegas BELO Complaint]; Order on Venue at 1, Banegas v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 17-7429
(E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Banegas Order on Venue].
195
Banegas BELO Complaint, supra note 194, ¶ 6.
196
Banegas Order on Venue, supra note 194, at 1.
197
The MSA allows “consolidation or joinder of matters at issue or actions
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” though it prohibits actions
under “Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other class, mass,
or aggregate action procedures.” MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.G.1.d.
198
See Motion to Consolidate “B1 BELO” Actions ¶ 27, In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2017) (“Requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to participate in pretrial discovery and proceedings in multiple courts across the Gulf South, hire experts, and litigate every aspect of all
actions individually would result in ‘litigation fatigue’ to the defendants’ sole benefit. Conversely, allowing consolidation would allow all counsel to participate
more efficiently.”).
194
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F. Claims Administrator’s Shortcomings
Cannot Be Rectified Under the MSA
Claimants’ rights to compensation have been curbed by Garretson’s conduct in making it more difficult to file claims. Most importantly, Garretson has regularly disregarded the deadlines that it
is mandated to follow by the MSA.199 For example, under § V.E.,
Garretson is obligated to send the Notice of Defect within thirty days
from the date of receipt of the Proof of Claim form,200 but Garretson
does not follow this deadline.201 To take another example, under §
V.J., Garretson has thirty days after receiving the last cured defect
to issue final determination of what, if any, compensation is due;202
however, Garretson also does not follow this deadline.203 Further,
under § V.M., Garretson has fourteen days after receiving the review
request to review the appeal,204 but, again, Garretson does not follow the deadline.205 Finally, although the MSA requires Garretson
to review the NOIS and transmit it to BP within ten days,206 Garretson has taken as long as seven months to process the NOIS.207 In
one—not unusual—instance, Garretson took from September 3,
2015 to May 2, 2016, to process plaintiff’s NOIS.208
Garretson’s disregard for deadlines has caused multiple problems for claimants and their attorneys. First, Garretson has unnecessarily prolonged the process of compensating claimants under SPC,
and these claimants’ payments are not adjusted for the post-judgment interest rate as are the damages that are awarded in a civil
trial. 209 Second, there are instances of claimants giving up their
claims to higher compensation (for example deciding to take $1,300
under A1 instead of pursuing $7,750 under A2) because they no

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
MSA, supra note 5, § V.E.
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
MSA, supra note 5, § V.J.
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
MSA, supra note 5, § V.M.
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.C.1.
Odom Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings, supra note 91, ¶ 8.
Id.
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
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longer want—or can—wait for the money to cover their medical expenses. 210 Third, by not following the deadlines, Garretson makes it
more difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to plan and organize their
work because they never know when they should expect a response
from Garretson.211
Garretson is also heavy-handed in examining claims, and, as
some plaintiff attorneys say, it acts less as an impartial claims administrator and more as an insurer or adjuster of BP’s interests.212
For example, Garretson requires most claimants to remedy their
SPC claims through an amendment or by sending additional documents.213 In one of its periodic status reports to the court, Garretson
stated that the claims have been and continue to be “impacted by
high defect rates”: seventy-eight percent (78%) of SPC claims submitted to Garretson have received either a “Request for Additional
Information” or a “Notice of Defect.”214 Another fifty-three percent
(53%) of SPC claims are voluntarily updated by the claimants.215 If
Garretson, an experienced claims administrator that has handled
over twenty class action settlements, claims that the defect rate of
SPC claims is “high,” there is little reason to doubt its judgment.216
Also, Garretson is unforthcoming when it comes to the medical
programs mandated by the MSA.217 Garretson releases limited information regarding the PMCP.218 This is because, as all evidence
points to this conclusion, the program—despite being a part of the

210

Id.
Id.; Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94.
212
Toce Telephone Interview, supra note 172; Downs Telephone Interview,
supra note 54.
213
November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 10–11.
214
Id. at 2–3.
215
Id.
216
Id.; Comprehensive Project List, GARRETSON RESOL. GROUP,
https://www.garretsongroup.com/about-us/comprehensive-project-list?__hstc
=30026080.7687b01d84a93fbe78c0a8cf88917f88.1495039981970.1513101809
395.1513106206698.7&__hssc=30026080.3.1513106206698&__hsfp=2714116
927 (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
217
MSA, supra note 5, §§ VII, IX.
218
November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 14–15.
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MSA—is being implemented only partially.219 Garretson does not
maintain a publically available list of medical providers with whom
Garretson has “enter[ed] into a written contract . . . to provide medical consultation visits.”220 Garretson only provides information on
the implementation of the GRHOP, as the MSA mandates Garretson
to provide to the parties reports on the program’s implementation.221
Despite systematic disregard for the deadlines, which has
harmed plaintiffs’ right to be compensated, in practice, Garretson is
immune from suffering any consequences of its conduct. Although
the MSA states that the Eastern District of Louisiana “shall have
ongoing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Claims Administrator,”
it is unclear whether the Court may sanction Garretson as it is not a
party to the case. 222 Further, Garretson may only be removed by
BP’s and plaintiffs’ joint motion.223 Because Garretson’s continued
misconduct benefits BP (e.g. some claimants are giving up as the
process of compensation is dragging on, memories of the spill are
fading, and documents, such as medical proof, are getting lost), it is
highly unlikely that the defendant would agree to remove Garretson
as a claims administrator.224
CONCLUSION
Under current Rule 23(e)(2), the class action settlement can only
bind class members if the court approves the settlement after a fairness hearing during which the judge assumes the position of the
class fiduciary.225 In this Comment, I argued that the fiduciary duty
of the court should continue even after the settlement’s approval. As
I discussed in Part I, the relationship between the court and the parties in class settlements governed by Rule 23(e)(2) is different than
the relationship in non-class-action settlements. Further, in Parts II
219

MSA, supra note 5, §VII. Garretson did not respond to any requests to
comment or provide any information on the Periodic Medical Consultation Program for the purpose of this article. From February 2014 until December 2018,
Garretson scheduled 3,720 physician visits for class members. November 2018
Status Report, supra note 11, at 14.
220
MSA, supra note 5, § VII.C.4.
221
Id. §§ IX.D.6, IX.F.3.
222
See id. § XXI.A.5.
223
Id. § XXI.A.3.
224
Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54.
225
See supra Part I.
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and III, I showed how a seemingly uncomplicated and straightforward class action settlement that was praised by the legal community and that promised just and swift compensation to class members
turned into a prolonged nightmarish struggle for anybody wanting
to receive more than the basic award of $1,300. Also, I showed a
failing mechanism that is forcing a large group of claimants into
second-phase Back-End Litigation Option and that is expected to
clog many federal district courts in the Gulf Coast region with unnecessary litigation.
The Deepwater Horizon MSA—which failed in its purpose of
providing fair and swift compensation to class members—is an example of why courts should have a continuing power to reassess the
class action settlement when justice so requires. The MSA did not
live up to its promises and, ironically, it fulfilled the catastrophic
visions of the proponents of the MSA that not approving the settlement would possibly lead to prolonged litigation as in the case of
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.226 As Judge Barbier noted during
the Fairness Hearing in 2012 “there is still litigation [of the Exxon
Valdez case] going on . . . up in Alaska” and “that case was again
before the United States Supreme Court on a legal issue of punitive
damages . . . I do not plan to be here in 20 or 23 years handling this
case.”227 Unfortunately, without the judicial power to reassess class
action settlements, Judge Barbier may still be hearing Deepwater
Horizon litigation years after the disaster.

226
227

Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 183, 269–70.
Id. at 269–70.

